COMPROMISE

OF SUIT

in reply to the question of the lessee, that the sewer connected with
the premises was in a good condition if he did not know the assertion to be false, he would not be
liable to repair the drainage,

BY ATTORNEY.

though the sewer was entirely
out of order. This, however, is
not law in Pennsylvania: See
Wolfe v. Arrott, ro9 Pa. 473.
W. D. L.
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- Compromise of Suit by Attorney.
A compromise of a pending suit by an attorney, in violation of express
instructions from his client, will not bind the latter; and when the parties
can be placed in statu quo, and application is seasonably made, the Court
has power to vacate any judgment founded on such compromise, and to
order it and the compromise stricken from the files.
POWER OF ATTORNEY TO BIND CLIENT BY COMPROMISE
OR SETTLEMENT.

By the very fact of his employment, an attorney-at-law acquires
complete control of the action, in
so far as the management and direction thereof, and the remedy sought,
are concerned; and he has an implied authority to do any acts, or
take any steps, which merely relate
to the conduct of the suit, or the
remedy; but he cannot take any
measures, or enter into any agreement, which tends to affect the
right of action, without some express additional authority from the
client. Davis zp. Hall, 90 Mo. 659;
Reported in 34 N. E. Rep. 261.

S. C., 3 S. V. Rep. 382. By virtue
of this implied authority, he may
waive the client's right of trial by
jury by an agreement to refer the
case to arbitrators: Thomas v.
Hews, 2 C. & M. 327 ; Buckland v.
Conway, i6 Mass. 396; Jenkins v.
Gillespie, 1o Sm. & M-. (Miss.) 3 ;
Holker v. Parker, 7 Cranch, 436;
Morris v. Grier, 76 N. C. 410-;
Binghan v. Guthrid, 7 'Harris (Pa.),
418 ; Sargeant v. Clark, loS Pa. 588.
May withdraw a juror: Swinfen v.
IA. Chelmsford, 5 H. & N. 89o;
Strauss v. Francis, 1 L. R. Q. B. 379.
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May -restore an action after non
pros: Reinhold v. Alberti, I Binn.

Rep.

297. Cannot agree that the
dismissal of a suit shall operate as
469.
And, -when- several suits a bar to the maintenance of an
are brought by the-same plaintiff action thereon for malicious proseagainst different defendants, the cution: Marbourg v. Smith, ii
grounds of defence being the same
Kan. 554.
Cannot bind a landin each case, the attorneys for the
lord who ha brought suit to evict
a tenant, by an agreement that if
several parties may bind their
clienti by an agreement that all the the tenant will submit to a default,
cases should abide the final decision
execution shall not be issued for a
in ond case: R. R. v. Stephens, 36
week, or if issued, shall not be
Mo. i5o. It has also been held that
served within that time: Weiland
the attorney may, without special
v. White, io9 Mass. 392; nor make
authority, dismiss or discontinue
a valid agreement to extend the
the suit: Davis v. Hall, go Mo. 659;
time of the payment of a judgS. C., 3 S. W. Rep. 382; Gaillord
ment, or suspend 'proceedings
v. Smart, 6 Cow. 385; Simpson v. thereon : Beatty v. Hamilton (Pa.),
Brown, i Wash. Ty. 247, but this is
17 At. Rep. 755; Lockhart v.
controverted in Filby v. Miller, 25 Wyatt, io Ala. 231; Pendexter v.
Pa. 264. Aid if allowable at all, can
Vernon, 9 Humnph. (Tenn.) 84. He
only be permitted when it is withcannot release the sureties upon a
out prejudice, for an attorney has note or. claim: Stoll v. Sheldon,
no power to release or abandon his
13 Neb. 207; Givens v. Briscoe, 3
client's claim to the defendant:
J. J. Marsh (Ky.), 529; Say. Inst.
Smith v. Dixon, 3 Metc. (Ky.) 438;
v. Chinn, 7 Bush. (Ky.) 539. Nor
Gilliland v. Gasque, 6 S. C. 4o6;
give an extension of time to the
Hickey v. Stringer, 2[ S. W. Rep. principal obligor on a note, especi716.
ally when, if the act were valid, its
On the other hand, 'an attorney immediate legal consequence would
cannot surrender any substantial
be ihe release of the sureties:
right of his client, without the con- Roberts v. Smith, 3 La. Ann. 205.
sent of the latter: Dickerson v. Whether or not h6 has implied
Hodges (N. J.), io Atl. Rep. iii.
power to release property from the
And it has even been held in that
lien of an attachment is in some
State that this applies to matters doubt. It seems to be the prevailthat relate to the conduct of the ing opinion that-when the attach-suit: Howe v. Lawrence, 22 N.J. ment is only an incident of the
L. 99; though, in view of the form of action, -he may release it
general rule as to such matters, it before judgment: Monson v. Hawis difficult to understand how this ley, 30 Conn. 5I; Moulton v.
can be true, unless there is proof of Bowker, Ir 5 Mass. 36; Levy v.
fraud or collusion on the part of
Brown, 56 Miss. 83. But he certhe attorney. .
tainly cannot release the lien of a
Accordingly, without .special
judgment without express author-authority,
an attorney cannot
ity: Dollar Say. Bk. v. Robb, 4
waive .hisclient's right to redeem
Brews. (Pa.) io6; Doub v. Barnes,
the property in the action, or any
i Md. Ch. 127; Phillips v. Dobsteps necessary thereto : Graves v. bins, 56 Ga. -617. Bven though he
Long,87 Ky. 44, ; S. C., 9 S. W.
honestly believe that it will be for
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the client's benefit : Wilson v. Jennings, 3 Ohio St. 528. So, too,
without authority, he cannot assign
or sell the client's claim: Russell
v. Drummond, 6 Ind. 216; White
v. Hildreth, 13 N. H. o4; Child v.
Eureka Powder Works, 44 N. H.
354; Cord v. Walbridge, 18 Ohio
4i ; Rowland v. State, 58 Pa. 196;
Penniman z'. Patchin, 5 Vt. 346. Or
judgment: Head v. Gervais, Walk.
(Miss.) 431; Rice v. Troup, 62
Miss. 186; Campbell's App., 29
Pa. 4oi; Fassitt v. Middleton, 47
Pa. 214 ; Mayer v. Blease, 4 S. C.
xo. Not even to one of several
judgment debtors who has paid
the full amount of the judgment,
and desires to secure contribution
from the others : Maxwell v. Owen,
7 Coldw. (Tenn.) 63o.
When the defendant has been
arrested on ca. sa., after judgment,
the plaintiff's attorney has no
authority to release him, %ithout
receiving actual payment of the
debt: Jackson v. Bartlett, 8 Johns.
(N. Y.) 361; Kellogg v. Gilbert,
ioJohns. (N. Y.) 220; Simonton z,.
Barrell, 21 Wend. 362; Carter v.
Talcott, io Vt. 471.
Nor can he
compromise a criminal prosecution
on receiving part payment of funds
misappropriated: Harper v. Nat'l
Ins. Co., 56 Fed. Rep. 281.
In Chancery, counsel have power
to bind their clients by consent
decrees, without special authority,
provided there be no fraud or
imposition: Holmes v. Rogers, 13
Cal. 191 ; Williams v. Simmons, 79
Ga. 649; Jones v. Williamson, 5
Coldw. (Tenn.) 371, but it is very
doubtful whether they possess the
power in similar circumstances to
confess judgment in a court of law.
In Indiana, New York and Texas,
it has been held that they have
that power, and that the client, if

injured, must look to the attorney
for redress: Thompson v. Pershing,
86 Ind. 3o3; Denton v. Noyes, .6
Johns. (N. Y.) 296; Williams v.
Nolan, 58 Tex. 7o8. But the weight
of authority is opposed to that view:
Preston v. Hill, 5o Cal. 43 ; Pfister
v. Wade, 69 Cal. 133 ; Peo. v.
Lamborn, 2. fll. 123 ; Wadhamns v.
415; Edwards v.
Gay, 73 11.
Edwards, 29 La. An. 597; Ohlquest v. Farwell, 71 Iowa, 231. In
an early case in Iowa, Potter v.
Parsons, 14 Iowa, 286, it was held,
that the attorney for the defendant
may make a valid agreement for
judgment against his client, if
coupled with a stay of execution;
but this would seem to be overruled
in Ohlquest v. Farwell, stifra.
As the compromise or settlement
of a suit strikes directly at the root
of the cause of action, it would
seem on principle that an attorney
has no implied authority to make it
except upon payment of the full
amount due; but the English decisions on this subject are far from
being unanimous. In Fray v.
Voules, i El. & El. 839, the authority was denied, and it was held that
an attorney could not make even a
compromise that was reasonable,
bona fide, and for the client's benefit, and that if lie did so, he would
be liable to an action for damages,
though the actual damage was but
nominal. In Swinfen v. Swinfen,
24 Beav. 549, Romilly, M. R., ruled
to the same effect; but on a previous
motion in the same case in the Common Pleas, 18 C. B. 485, the court
declared thatthey would not inquire
into the authority of counsel to
compromise, when done in the
exercise of a sound discretion, and,
in his opinion, for the best interests
of his clients, on the ground that
"it would be most fatal to the due
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administration ofjustice, if we were
to allow the authority of counsel to
be thus questioned.". Sed quwre?
In Swinfen v. Ld Chelmsford, 5
H. & X 890, an action by the
client against the counsel, g-rowing
out of the compromise in Swinfen
v. Swinfen,. supra, the more reasonable rule was adopted by the
Exchequer that counsel may not
bind their clients by any agreement collateral to the suit, and
that, therefore, the compromise
under consideration, whidh was that
the plaintiff should give up her,
claim to the estate in question and
receive an annuity instead, was not
valid. But this ruling seems to
admit that a bona fide compromise
strictly germane to the subject-matter of the suit, as the acceptance of
-aless sum than that claimed to be
due on a contract, or as damages for
an injury, will be binding on the
client, in the absence of fraud or
imposition. Such has been the doctrine of many of the cases; Chown
v. Parrott, r4 C. B. .(N. S.) 74;
Prestwi~h v. Poley, i8 C.B. (N. S.)
8o6; Thomas v. Harris, 27 L. J.
Exch. (N. S.) 353 ; Re Wood, Exp.
Wenham, 21 W. R. io4; Butler v.
Knight, 2 L. R. Exch. ro 9 . But
some have gone even a step farther
than this, and it seems to be now
the settled 'rule in the English
courts that an attorney, without
special authority, has the implied
power to bind his client by a bona
fide compromise, even though made
in violation of the ciient's express
directions not to compromise, provided the other party also acts in
good faith, and without knowledge
of the prohibition: Brady v. Curran, 2 ITr. R. C. L. 314; Berry v,
Mullen, 5 Ir. R. Eq. 368; Strauss
v. Francis, I L. R. Q. B. 379.
In Wharton on Agency, H 590-2,

CLIENT

and Story on Agency, 9th Ed., 24
(note by Greenough), it is stated
that the generalrule in America is
the same as that in England; but
in this instance these usually accurate writers have fallen into error.
There are a few cases which declare
that a reasonable bona fide compromise, made without special
authority, will not be disturbed;
but those very cases admit that the
attorney, merely as such, has,' in
strict adherence to legal principles,
no right to make it: Holker v.
Parker, 7 Cranch, 436. Whipple v.
Whitman, x3 R. I. 512; S. C., 43
Am. Rep. 42 ; Roller v. Wooldridge,
46 Tex. 485.
The true American rule, as is
shown by the vast preponderance
of authority, is, that, without express instructions, an attorney has
no power, merely from his employment as such, to bind his client by
any compromise or settlement for
any amount less than the whole
sum due or claimed, or to release
any substantial right of his client,
whether the action be pending, or
have proceeded to judgment. He
can do no act which destroys the
cause of action without receiving
payment: Robinson -v. Murphy,
69 Ala. 543; Pickett v. Bk. 32 Ark.
346; Ambrose v. McDonald, 53
Cal. 28; Trope v. Kerns, 83 Cal.
553 ; S. C , 23 Pac. Rep. 691 ; Derwort v. Loofiier, 21 Conn. '245;
Wadhams v. Gay, 73 Ill. 415;
Miller v. Lane, 13 Ill. App. 648;
Wakeman v. Jones, i Ind. 517;
Miller v. Edmonston, 8 Blackf.
(Ind.) 291; Repp v. Wiles (Ind.),
29 N. B. Rep..441 ; Stuck v. Reese,
15 Iowa, 122; Martin v. Capital
Ins. Co. (Iowa), 52 N. W. Rep.
534; Smith v. Dixon, 3 Metc. (Ky.)
438; Lewis v. Gamage, i Pick.
(Mass.) 347 ; N. Y., N. H. & H. R.
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R. v. Martin (Mass.), 33 N. E.
Rep. 578; Eaton v. Knowles, 61
Mich. 625; Fitch v. Scott, 3 How.
(Ms.) 314; Levy v. Brown, 56
Miss. 83; Davidson v. Rozier, 23
Mo. 387; Walden v. Bolton, 55
Mo. 405; Spears v. Ledergerber, s6
Mo. 465; Semple v. Atkinson, 64
Mo. 5o4; Roberts v. Nelson, 22
Mo. App. 28; Moye v. Cogdell, 69
N. C. 93; Watts v. French, 19 N.
J. Eq. 407; Hamrick v. Combs, 14
Neb. 381 ; Shaw v. Kidder, 2 How.
Pr. (N. Y.) 243; Mandeville v.
Reynolds, 5 Hun. (N. Y.) 338; S.
C. Aff., 68 N. Y. 528; Beers v.
Hendrickson, 45 N. Y. 665; De
Mets v. Dagron, 53 N. Y. 635;
Barrett v. Third Av. R. R. Co., 45
N. Y. 628; Chambers v. Miller, 7
Watts. (Pa.) 63; Filby v. Miller,
25 Pa. 264; Stokely v. Robinson,
34 Pa. 315 ; Housenick v. Miller,
93 Pa. 514; Mackey. v. Adair, 99
Pa. 143; Twp. of North Whitehall
v. Keller, ioo Pa. io5; Isaacs v.
Zugsmith, 1o3 Pa. 77 ; Brockley v.
Brockley, 122 Pa. i; Smith v.
Bossard, 2 McCord, Ch. 406; Bradford v. Arnold, 33 Tex. 412 ; Adams
v. Roller, 35 Tex. 711; Smith v.
Lambert, 7 Gratt. (Va.) 142; Vail
v. Jackson, 15 Vt 314; Granger v.
Batchelder, 54 Vt 248; Crotty v.
Eagle, 35 %. Va. 143; Kelly v.
Wright, 65 Wis. 236; Holker v.
Parker, 7 Cranch, 436; Pierce v.
Brown, 8 Biss. C. Ct. 534. "The
attorney has no right to commute
the debt of his client, to release the
person of his debtor when in prison
by virtue of a ca. sa., or to enter a
retraxit in a suit, to execute a
release, or to do any other act
which destroys the cause of action
without
receiving
payment :"
Smith v. Lambert, supra. A
fortiori, does this rule hold good
when the client has given positive

instructions not to compromise;
Dalton v. R. R. (the principal
case) (Mass.), 34 N. R. Rep. 261, or
wh en there is a marked discrepancy
between the amount due or claimed
and the amount for which the compromise is made, as in Hamrick v.
Combs, 14 Neb. 381, where the
compromise was for about one-third
the face value of a good judgment.
"When the sacrifice is such as to
leave it scarcely possible that, with
a full knowledge of every circumstance, such a compromise could
be fairly made, there can be no
hesitation in saying that the com-,
promise, being unauthorized, and
being therefore in itself void,
ought not to bind the injured party.
Though it may assume the form of
an award or of a judgment at law,
the injured party, if his own conduct has been perfectly blameless,
ought to be relieved against it. This
opinion is the more reasonable
because it is scarcely possible that,
in such a case, the opposite party
can be ignorant of the unfair advantage he is gaining. His conduct
can seldom fail to be tainted with
some disingenuous practice; or,
if it is not, he knows that he is accepting a surrender of the rights of
another from a man who is not
authorized to make it: " C.J. MARSHALL, in Holker v. Parker, 7
Cranch, 436.
This rule practically amounts to
no more than a reaffirmation of
the acknowledged principle that
he who deals with a special agent
must look to the extent of his
authority. The debtor .in such a
case is put on inquiry as to the
authority of the attorney and settles with him at his own peril:
Miller v. Lane, 13 Ill. App. 648.
And it makes no difference what
form the transaction may take,

POWER OF ATTORNEY TO BIND CLIENT

whether it be entitledbythe parties
in award or a judgment, or be
honestly styled a compromise, it
will still be subject to avoidance by
ffhe courts: Holker v. Parker,
supra; Stokely v. Robinson, 34 Pa.
315. Even if the client lives in
another State, express authority
must be obtained before the compromise will be valid: Granger v.
Batchelder, 54 Vt. 248; S. C., 41
Am. Rep. 846..An attorney retained to secure
possession of real estate by legal
proceedings, cannot bind his client
by an agreement to pay the party
in possession a suni of money in
consideration of the surrender of
the premises: Stuck v. Reese, 15
Iowa, 122. And when there are
several plaintiffs, those only who
assent to the compromise will be
bound, and* the attorney must
account to those who do not assent
for the full amount of the claim:
Repp v. Wiles (Ind.), 29 N. E. Rep.
441.
This rule is not iron-clad, however, and it may be abrogated by
equitable considerations. As we
have seen, the courts will be slow
to disturb a reasonable compromise
made by the attorney in a bona
fide belief that he is acting for the
best interests of his client: Holker
v. Parker, 'sulra; Whipple v.
Whitman, 13 R. I. 512; S. C., 43
Am. Rep. 42; Roller v. Wooldridge, 46 Tex. 485; Bonney v.
Morrill, 57 Me. 368; Black v.
-Rogers, 75 Mo. 44T; Peo. v. Quick,
92 Ill. 580; Re Heath's Will (Iowa),
48 N. W. Rep. 1037.
Such a
compromise will also be held valid,
where there is no time or opportunity, for consultation with the
client, and his interests may be
seriously imperilled by delay:
Union Mut. Life Ins. Co. z'. Buch-

anan, ioo Ind. 63; Brockley v.
Brockley, 122 Pa. i. So, whenthe
plaintiff is only a titular party,
and a fair and judicious compromise
is made with the knowledge and
assent of the real party in interest,
it will be upheld: Whipple v.
Whitman, supra.
As the attorney cannot, without
express authority, compromise for
less than the amount due or
claimed, neither can, he, unless
specially authorized, receive anything but money in payment of a
debt or satisfaction of a judgment:
Gullett v. Lewis, 3 Stew. (Ala.)23 ;
McCarver v. Nealey, i G. Greene
(Iowa), 36o ; Graydon v. Patterson,
13 Iowa, 256; Drain v. Doggett, 41
Iowa, 682; Bigler v. Toy, 68 Iowa,
687 ; Perkins v. Grout, 2 La. An.
328; Phelps v. Preston, 9 La. An.
488; Ke)er v. Scott, io Miss. 8i;
Baldwin v. Merrill, 8 Humph.
(Tenn.) 132; Anderson v. Boyd,
64 Tex. io8. And this-money must
be legal currency,of the United
States: Bailey v. Bagley, x9 La.
An. 172; Lord v. Burbank, 18 Me.
178. But a payment made-in Virginia, in 1862, in confederate currency, then the only currency, -was
held good, as the client had not expressly forbidden it: Pidgeon v.
Williams, 21 Graft. (Va.) 251.
Similar payments, however, made
in Louisiajia and West Virginia,
during the .wr, were held not
valid : Davis v. Lee, 20 La. An. 248;
Harper v. Harvey, 42 W. Va. 539.
But when the creditor, on beinginformed of the payment, did not
notify the attorney of his objections to receiving such money, he
was held concluded by his silence:
Johnson v. Gibbons, 27 Gratt.
(Va.) 632.
The attorney cannot take in payment, or as collateral security, with-
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out special authority. notes of third
persons: Cook v. Bloodgood, 7 Ala.
683; Jeter v. Haviland, 24 Ga. 252;
Jones v. Ransom, 3 Ind. 327; GarviA v. Lowry, 15 Miss. 24; Langdon v. Potter, 13 Mass. 318; Kent
v. Chapman, 18 W. Va. 485. Or of
himself: Cook v. Bloodgood, sufira;
Vanderline v. Smith, I8 Mo. App.
55. Bonds: Smock v. Dade, 5 Rand
(Va.) 639; Wilkinson v. Holloway,
7 Leigh. (Va.) 277 ; Kent v. Ricards,
3 Md. Ch. 392; Kent v. Chapman,
iS W. Va. 485. Drafts: Portis v.
Ennis, 27 Tex. 574. Depreciated
money or bank paper : Chapman v.
Cowles, 41 Ala. io3; West v. Ball,
12 Ala. 340; Trumbull z. Nicholson,
27 Ill. r49. County warrants: Herrman v. Shomon, 24 Kan. 387. An
assignment of a judgment : Clark
v. Kingsland, 9 Miss. 248. Oradebt
secured by mortgage: Walker v.
Scott. 13 Ala. 644. .Nor can he take
other property, real or personal, as
land: Huston v. Mitchell, 14 S. &
R. (Pa.) 307 ; Stackhouse v. O'Hara,
14 Pa. 88. Wood: Pitkin v. Harris,
69 Mich. 133. Houses,.merchandise,
&c.: Coners. v. Rose, i Desau. (S.
C.) 46!. A foriorihe cannot take
in payment or satisfaction a debt
due by himself, to another, or permit the debtor in the action to set
such a debt off against the plaintiff's claim on settlement: Gullett
v. Lewis, 3 Stew. (Ala.) 23; Cost v.
Genette, i Port. (Ala.) 212; Craig
V Ely, 5 Stew. & P. (Ala.) 354;
Keller v. Scott, io Miss. 81; Vanderline v. Smith, 18 Mo. App. 55;
Hamrick v. Combs, 14 Neb. 381;
Wilkinson v. Holloway, 7 Leigh,
(Va.) 277; Wiley v. Mahood, io
W. Va. 206. But cases. can be
readily imagined in which the note
of a third person of responsibility
would be far better than the security
of even a judgment against the
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debtor; and in these it is hardly
likely that the courts would enforce
the technical rule, even if the client
were foolish enough to object: See
Livingston v. Radcliff, 6 Barb. (N.
Y.) 201 ; Dolan v. Van Demark, 35
Kan. 305.
Though he cannot take part of the
debt or claim in satisfaction of the
whole, an attorney may, nevertheless, receive partial payments:
Hall Safe & Lock Co. v. Harwell,
88 Ala. 441; Pickett v. Bates, 3
La. An. 627. And when a note is
collected part in money, and a security is given for the balance, the
money payment is good pro tanto:
Davis v. Severance (Minn.), 52 N.
W. Rep. i4o.
But, as in all other cases of unauthorized action by agents, these
acts of the attorney may be ratified
by the client, by conduct as well
as by words: Peo. v. Lamborn, i
Scam. 123; Nolan v. Jackson, 16
Ill. 272; Jennings v. McConnel,
17 Ill. 148 ; Trumbull v. Nicholson,
27 Ill. 149; Melvin v. Ins. Co., 8o
Ill. 446; Wetherbee v. Fitch, 117
Ill. 67; Moye v. Cogdell, 69 N. C.
93; Terhune v. Colton, io N. J.
Eq. 21.
A compromise is good, if made
in the presence of the client, and
he does not dissent: Chambers v.
Mason, 5 C. B. (N. S.) 59. If he
acquiesces in it, after being fully
informed of the transaction, by remnaining silent, or by receiving the
fruits of it: Abbe v. Rood, 6 MeLean (U. S.) io6; Mayer v. Foulkrod, 4 Wash. C. C. 503; Maddux
z'. Bevan, 39 Md. 485-; Semple v.
Atkinson, 64 Mo. 504. Or by neglecting to dissent from or repudiate
the compromise within a reasonable time. Swinfen v. Swinfen, 24
Beav. 549; Black v. Rogers, 75
Mo. 441; Benedict v. Smith, xo

